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Bolden (Jason) v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 28 (Jul. 08, 2021)1
CRIMINAL LAW: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE AFFIDAVIT
REQUIREMENT OF NRS 173.035(2)
Summary
When the State seeks and obtains leave from a district court to proceed against the accused
by information, it must support that motion with an affidavit of any person who has knowledge of
the commission of an offense and is a competent witness to testify. This affidavit requirement can
be satisfied with a preliminary hearing transcript. The district court may grant this leave on the
State’s showing that the justice court committed egregious error in dismissing.
Background
The Appellee, the State, filed a criminal complaint against the Appellant, James Bolden,
and the matter proceeded to a preliminary hearing in justice court. The Appellant was charged after
he approached Brenton and Bryston Martinez outside of a Las Vegas apartment building and fired
seven shots. The shots made contact with Brenton and the wall of an occupied apartment.
Immediately after this incident the Appellant was identified as the shooter by Brenton after police
showed him a photo. Bryston told the police that he saw the shooter and provided a description
that matched the Appellant.
Both Brenton and Bryson Martinez testified at the preliminary hearing but gave testimony
that contradicted their original statements to the police. Bryston denied having seen the shooter,
despite telling the police he had on the day of the shooting. Brenton testified that he did not
recognize the Appellant and that he had no recollection of what the shooter looked like, despite
positively identifying him on the day of the shooting. The justice of the peace noted the
inconsistency between the brothers’ statements to the police and their subsequent testimony at
preliminary hearing. She found the brothers to lack credibility because of these inconsistencies.
She additionally found their statements about drinking and using drugs on the day of the shooting
undermined the reliability of their statements to the police. For those reasons, the justice of the
peace did not find probable cause and sua sponte dismissed all the charges against the Appellant.
The State filed a motion under NRS 173.035(2), seeking leave to proceed by information. 2
The State supported its motion by attaching a copy of the transcript of the preliminary hearing
from justice court. The motion was granted unopposed. At trial, Brenton positively identified the
Appellant as the shooter. That identification along with the 911 call and Bryston’s description of
the shooter were all admitted into evidence. The jury convicted the Appellant of illegal possession
of a firearm, battery with a deadly weapon, and seven counts of discharging a firearm at or into an
occupied structure.
Discussion
The Appellant failed to oppose the State’s motion for leave and as such forfeited all but
plain error review. In order for the court to consider the forfeited error the appellant must
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demonstrate that: (1) there was an error; (2) the error is plain, meaning that it is clear under current
law from a casual interpretation; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The
Court found that the appellant’s substantial rights were potentially affected.
The only procedure that was not in line perfectly with the requirements of NRS 173.035(2)
was the State’s use of a preliminary hearing transcript instead of an affidavit. The Appellant argued
that because a preliminary hearing transcript is not an affidavit that the district court should have
rejected the State’s motion. The Court concedes that the statute refers only to an affidavit and does
not provide affidavit equivalents. However, the Court found that under NRS 53.045, which allows
a court to consider certain unsworn declarations in lieu of an affidavit, a preliminary hearing
transcript qualified as a declaration that satisfies NRS 53.045.
The Court discussed a similar case of statutory construction from California where an antiSLAPP statute allowed for the court to consider “supporting and opposing affidavits” when ruling
on a special motion to dismiss. 3 A grand jury transcript was found to be an acceptable substitute
under a similar California statute that permitted certain unsworn declarations as affidavit
equivalents.4 The California court in Sweetwater, found that the grand jury transcript was an
acceptable substitute because it is at least as reliable as an affidavit. The Court applied this to the
current case and found that a certified preliminary hearing was an acceptable substitute because
when looking at the policy purposes of this statute there would be no reason to prohibit use of an
acceptable affidavit substitute in order to employ strict compliance with the affidavit requirement.
The Court found that the district court did not err in granting the State’s motion for leave because
the certified preliminary hearing transcript provided an accurate way for the district court to
determine whether the justice of the peace made an egregious error in determining probable cause.
The Court additionally upheld the district court’s finding that the justice of the peace made
an egregious error in not finding probable cause. The preliminary hearing is not a trial and if an
inference of criminal agency can be drawn from the evidence then it is proper for the justice of the
peace to draw it. The slight or marginal evidence standard at the preliminary hearing does not
permit the justice of the peace to dismiss charge where evidence permits the finder of fact to draw
an inference of criminal agency. Despite conflicting evidence, the State presented enough evidence
for the inference of criminal agency and the justice of the peace committed an egregious error by
preventing a jury from making a credibility argument. The Court additionally held that the State
presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction because the Appellant was identified as the
shooter in a 911 call and Brenton’s photo identification, which were both made shortly after the
shooting. This evidence supported a rational juror finding the Appellant was the perpetrator
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
The State’s motion for leave to proceed to district court after the justice of the peace
dismissed all charges substantially complied with NRS 173.035(2) and demonstrated that the
justice of the peace committed an egregious error. Additionally, there was substantial evidence to
support the jury’s verdict. The Court affirmed the judgement of conviction.
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